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Firms that are more highly levered are forced to raise capital more often, a process that generates
information about them. Of course transparency can improve the allocation of capital. However,
when the information about the firm affects the terms under which the firm transacts with its
customers and employees, transparency can have an offsetting negative effect. Under relatively
general conditions, good news improves these terms of trade less than bad news worsens them,
implying that increased transparency can lower firm value. In addition, we show that transparency
can reduce the incentives of firms and stakeholders to undertake relationship specific investments.
The negative effects of transparency can lead firms to pass up positive NPV investments that require
external funding and to choose more conservative capital structures that they would otherwise
choose. These effects should be especially important for technology firms that require a reputation
for being on the “leading edge.”
Andres Almazan











The transparency of a ￿rm is often de￿ned as the extent to which outsiders can
evaluate the ￿rm￿s operations. In some situations it is bene￿cial for ￿rms to be
transparent and invite the scrutiny of outsiders. However, as we stress in this paper,
this is not always the case. Speci￿cally, we show that when a ￿rm￿s prospects depend
on its long-term relationships with its stakeholders, external scrutiny can create costs
that reduce ￿rm value.
This paper explores the interaction of two ideas. The ￿rst idea is that there is a
fundamental linkage between capital structure and transparency. Speci￿cally, since
more levered ￿rms require more frequent access to external capital markets, they are
subject to greater market scrutiny. The second idea is that if the success of a ￿rm
is related to the stakeholders￿ perception of the ￿rm, (i.e., the ￿rm￿s ￿image￿), then
in￿uencing the process by which information about the ￿rm is generated (i.e., how
the ￿rm￿s image is formed) becomes important to the ￿rm. As we argue, ￿rms that
are more conservatively ￿nanced are better able to accomplish this objective.
To understand the importance of stakeholders￿ perceptions, and the link between
capital structure and market scrutiny, consider the situation at Enron in the year
leading up to its bankruptcy. In 2001, Enron was ranked by Fortune magazine as the
22nd best company to work for and was perceived to be the market leader. Given
their favorable image, Enron was able to attract top graduates who were willing to
toil long hours to gain the experience that one can only acquire by working with
the very best.1 However, Enron was also very highly levered and in the fall of 2002,
after experiencing downturns in a number of its business units, they needed to raise
1In the ￿Vision and Values￿ video that Enron sent to its new recruits, Jeﬀ Skilling, at the time
Enron￿s CEO, promised the workers that: ￿when you work for Enron you are going to see the newest
thing, the newest products, the newest services, the newest way to think about things,￿ (taken from
Swartz and Watkins, (2003)).
1substantial amounts of external capital. During its attempt to raise capital it became
apparent that Enron￿s organization was deeply ￿awed. At this point, an association
with Enron became a liability, making it diﬃcult for Enron to keep workers and other
stakeholders as committed to the ￿rm as they were before. Perhaps, the subsequent
implosion of Enron would have occurred in any event. However, personnel problems,
as well as problems with other stakeholders, that were caused by the revelation of
negative information about the ￿rm, certainly hastened their demise.
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the link between the process by which ￿rms
raise external capital, and the extent to which their ￿rms are scrutinized, plays an
important role in determining ￿rms￿ ￿nancing choices. For example, a recent Wall
Street Journal article states that, despite the opportunity to save on ￿nancing costs,
many ￿rms avoided re￿nancing their debt following the recent drop in interest rates
because of these concerns:
￿This year￿s spate of accounting and other governance scandals has meant
that many companies are afraid to simply test the waters: even if a com-
pany wants to shoot for a lower rate, cutting its ￿nancing costs in the pro-
cess, a bond deal that goes awry could have a damaging ripple eﬀect, rais-
ing questions about a company￿s ￿nancial health and potentially weighing
on its stock price at a time when investors are particularly punishing.￿2
To better understand the costs associated with scrutiny, and its link to the capital
structure choice, we develop a model that allows us to analyze how transparency
aﬀects (i) the ￿rm￿s cost of retaining its workers, (ii) the ￿rm￿s incentives to make
relationship speci￿c investments, and (iii) the employees incentive to exert eﬀort.3
2From ￿The Re￿nancing Boom Hasn￿t Hit Corporations￿ by Craig Karmin, published in WSJ
10/15/2002. In the article, the head of the U.S. capital markets at Credit Suisse First Boston
declares: ￿chief ￿nancial oﬃcers are saying for a relatively small amount of savings, ￿I don￿t want to
expose myself to that risk.￿￿
3Although our argument applies to a broad range of stakeholders, for concreteness, our focus is
primarily on employees. In Section 8, we explicitly discuss of how the arguments can be extended
to the relationship of the ￿rm with other stakeholders.
2Speci￿cally we consider a setting where a ￿rm employs workers of diﬀerent (and
unobservable) types. Some workers develop marketable human capital by working
for leading ￿rms, and hence are willing to substitute monetary compensation for
on-the-job training. Others, however, are unable to either develop or market their
human capital, and hence only respond to monetary incentives. In this setting, the
information that is generated from, say, an equity issue may reveal that the ￿rm is
not longer an industry leader, which would make the ￿rm a less attractive employer
for those workers who bene￿t from the experience of working for a leading ￿rm. Of
course, on the positive side, market scrutiny may reveal information that enhances
the ￿rm￿s image, which would make it easier to retain these employees. However, as
it turns out, because not all workers bene￿t from working for a leader, the bene￿ts of
potential salary reductions do not fully oﬀset the costs of potential salary increases.
Hence, on average, the news generated by the equity issue increases the ￿rm￿s expected
employment costs and thereby reduces ￿rm value.
Building on the basic intuition that the revelation of information can aﬀect the
￿rm￿s relation with its stakeholders, we show that transparency and hence, high
leverage, can be especially costly when: (i) the human capital development of certain
workers (and hence the cost of retaining them) depend on (non-contractible) invest-
ments that the ￿r mm u s tm a k e ,( i i )w o r k e re ﬀort is an essential input and workers
devote less eﬀort if they believe that their employer may no longer be a leader, and
(iii) ￿rms have investment opportunities that require external ￿nancing. In this last
case, to avoid the cost of information revelation that arises when raising external
￿nancing, ￿rms may choose to pass up positive NPV investments.
Our analysis is related to several strands of the literature. First, our assump-
tion that raising external capital subjects ￿r m st om o r es c r u t i n yi sc o n s i s t e n tw i t h
empirical studies of the equity issue process. For example, Hansen and Torregrosa
3(1992) provide evidence of underwriters￿ monitoring in equity oﬀerings that is con-
sistent with information production by underwriters as part of their ￿due diligence.￿
More recently, Altinkili‚ c and Hansen (2003 forthcoming) provide evidence that the
process of pricing and underwriting secondary equity oﬀers increases volatility around
the issue, suggesting that information is being generated about the oﬀering ￿rm. In
addition, Gibson et al. (2003 forthcoming) present evidence that institutions, which
tend to acquire information prior to making additions to their portfolios, increase
their holdings around secondary equity oﬀerings.
There is also a large theoretical literature on the eﬀect of transparency on ￿rm
value in general,4 as well as a more speci￿c literature that examines the link between
capital structure and information generation. In particular, Easterbrook (1984) ar-
gues that ￿rms that are forced to pay out a higher fraction of their cash ￿ow are
subject to greater scrutiny because of their need to access external capital, and that
such a scrutiny bene￿ts ￿rms by reducing agency problems between shareholders and
managers.5 The scrutiny associated with the re￿nancing or renegotiation of existing
debt is also implicit in Jensen￿s (1986) free cash ￿ow argument, which states that high
leverage makes it more diﬃcult to undertake negative-NPV investments that cannot
be ￿nanced internally.6 Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), who consider the relationship
between capital structure and the liquidity of the ￿rm￿s securities, also examine how
diﬀerent capital structures produce diﬀerent incentives for the production of informa-
tion about a ￿rm.7 In contrast to our model, the above papers suggest that greater
transparency improves ￿rm value. However, Perotti and von Thadden (2000) provide
4For a recent survey on this literature see Verrecchia (2001) and the comments by Dye (2001).
5Similarly, since more transparent ￿r m sa r el i k e l yt ob em o r ee ﬃciently priced, they are also
likely to make better investment choices and thus be more valuable on average. See, for example,
Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999).
6S e ea l s oH a r ta n dM o o r e( 1995).
7The trade-oﬀs involved in the choice between more and less liquid securities is also analyzed by
Boot and Thakor (1993) and Fulghieri and Lukin (2001).
4a model with costs associated with making a ￿rm￿s strategies more transparent to
its competitors, which also has the implication that ￿rms have an incentive to make
￿nancing choices that limit transparency.8
In addition, although the logic of our argument is very diﬀerent, we share a number
of implications with Myers and Majluf (1984). In particular, the Myers and Majluf
model also suggests that highly levered ￿rms that require external equity issues may
pass up positive NPV investments. In contrast to Myers and Majluf, where ￿rms pass
up equity issues because of adverse selection problems, ￿r m sp a s su pe q u i t yi s s u e si n
our model because the information generated by an equity issue can actually destroy
value. As Dybvig and Zender (1991) and Hart (1993) have discussed, an explicit
commitment by ￿rms to issue equity would solve the underinvestment problem in
Myers and Majluf. However, in our model, unless such a commitment can be designed
to avoid scrutiny, it will not eliminate the incentives to be conservatively ￿nanced.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the economic
setting. The basic model is developed and analyzed in Sections 3 and 4. In Section 5
we consider the richer case in which the ￿rm controls both its capital structure and an
investment that increases the value of its workers￿ relationship with the ￿rm. Section
6 analyzes the interaction between transparency and endogenous eﬀort decisions by
the workers. Section 7 shows how concerns about transparency can generate an
underinvestment problem. Section 8 discusses the implications and some alternative
interpretations of the results and Section 9 concludes the paper. In the appendix,
we discuss the robustness of our ￿ndings to a richer contracting environment, i.e.,
long-term contracts.
8Teoh (1997) also considers a setting in which greater transparency can reduce ￿rm value.
9See Section 7 for further discussion on this issue.
52 The economic setting
Consider a ￿rm that operates in a risk-neutral economy where the market rate of
return is normalized to zero. There are four relevant dates in the life of the ￿rm, t =
0,1,2,3. The ￿rm chooses its capital structure at t =0 . It hires its workers at t =1
and provides them with some ￿rm-speci￿c training that makes them irreplaceable
in future dates. At t = 2 the workers recontract with the ￿rm. If all workers are
retained, the ￿rm generates a revenue of Y at t =3w h i l ei fi tr e t a i n saf r a c t i o n
0 < η < 1o ft h e mt h e￿rm produces the corresponding output fraction ηY .10
The workers are hired at t = 1 from a population of ex-ante identical workers with
a reservation utility U ≥ 0. The workers do not know their type when they are hired
but privately learn this information during their training. Speci￿cally, a proportion
￿ of the workers, which we call quick learners, will have at t = 2 a reservation utility
Uh. The remaining proportion (1 − ￿), which we call slow learners, will have at
t = 2 a reservation utility, Ul. W ed e n o t eb y∆U the quick learners￿ reservation
utility premium, Uh − Ul > 0, and assume, for simplicity, that workers are equally
productive within the ￿rm.
An additional important diﬀerence between worker types is that quick learners
bene￿t from working for leading ￿rms (henceforth, leaders) by obtaining an additional
experience gain of z. Intuitively, we think of a leader as a ￿rm which sets the future
technological and organizational standards for its industry and hence has the potential
to provide its workers with an especially valuable experience. In contrast, we assume
that non-leading ￿rms (henceforth, losers) provide no experience gains to any of its
workers (quick or slow learners) and that slow learners obtain no experience gains
even if they work for a leader. The size of the experience gain z is determined by
10As explained later, Y is the revenue of an all-equity ￿rm net of potential bene￿ts from leverage.
6non-veri￿able investments (e.g., R&D activities) that cost the ￿rm C(z), with C0 > 0,
C00 > 0, and occur after workers have been hired.
The ￿rm chooses an initial capital structure at t =0 , that we denote d. We assume
that ￿rms with higher leverage ratios are more likely to require external ￿nancing
before t = 2. The idea is that ￿rms that are required to pay out more of their
earnings to debtholders are more likely to realize a ￿nancial shortfall. To conserve on
notation, we also denote d as the probability that the ￿rm will raise external capital
at t =2 .
Initially, the ￿rm has a probability γ of being a leader and a probability 1 − γ of
not being a leader. We assume that if the ￿rm raises capital at t = 2, information is
generated that allows both workers and the entrepreneur to update these probabilities.
Hence, with a probability d, the ￿rm￿s type is revealed to all parties right at t =2 ,
while with a probability 1 − d,t h e￿rm￿s type is not revealed until t =3 .
Workers have no wealth and enjoy limited liability so the wages w1 and w2 that
they obtain at t =1a tt =2 , respectively, must be non-negative. We assume
that the ￿rm interacts with its workers through spot labor markets where workers
commit their labor and wages are set for just one period.11 So a worker hired at
t = 1 is free to leave the ￿rm at t =2a n dt h e￿rm is free to lay oﬀ its workers.
However, the ￿rm needs its workers to produce and, assuming that ￿Y > ∆U + ￿Ul
and (1 − ￿)Y> U l − ￿Uh + ￿z, it will ￿nd it optimal to make wage oﬀers at t =2
that are suﬃcient to induce all workers to stay.12 The stated assumptions essentially
require that the additional revenues generated by the workers are large relative to
their reservation utilities and both types of workers are present in the population in
11In the appendix, we explore how long-term contracts would aﬀect our results.
12The worker retention problem is similar to the screening problem of a monopolist who faces
customers of two unobservable types and ￿nds it pro￿table to serve both of them at uniform prices.
See Maskin and Riley (1984).
7non-negligible proportions.13
Finally, we capture the standard advantages and disadvantages of leverage by
postulating that debt adds some net bene￿ts X(d)t ot h e￿rm￿s potential revenue
Y.14 Consistent with the traditional trade-oﬀ theories of capital structure, we assume
that X(d) is a single-peaked function that reaches a maximum for some interior value
d∗ of the leverage ratio.15
The sequence of events in the model that we have just described is summarized
in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Sequence of Events.
3 Capital structure and retention wages
We start by considering the wage that the ￿rm must oﬀer to retain both types of
workers at date 2. To examine the advantages and disadvantages of transparency, we
compare the wage when the ￿rm￿s type is not revealed, with the expected wage when
the ￿rm￿s type is revealed. As we show, the wage that allows the ￿rm to retain both
t y p e so fw o r k e rp r o v i d e so n eo ft h et w ot y p e sw i t hr e n t s ,t h es i z eo fw h i c hd e p e n d s
on whether or not the ￿rm￿s type is revealed.
13For a non-leading ￿rm, retaining all worker types rather than only the slow learners pushes the
wage bill up to ￿Uh (to retain the quick learners), giving an additional compensation of (1−￿)(Uh−
Ul) to the slow learners. Similarly, for a leading ￿rm, retaining all workers rather than only the
quick learners pushes the wage bill up to (1−￿)Ul (to retain the slow learners), giving an additional
compensation of ￿[Ul − (Uh − z)] to the quick learners.
14So Y represents the revenue of an all-equity ￿rm while X(d) is the incremental revenue (net of
￿nancial distress costs) due to the positive (tax-related or incentive-related) eﬀects of leverage.
15To guarantee that d∗ ∈ (0,1), we assume X0(1) ≤ 0 ≤ X0(0) and X00 < 0.
83.1 Retention wages
Three possible states can occur at t = 2: what we call the opaque state in which the
￿rm￿s type remains unknown (s = u), and the transparent states, in which the ￿rm
is revealed to be a leader (s = g)o ral o s e r( s = b). If the ￿rm￿s type is not revealed,
the minimum wage required to retain both types of worker is
w
u =m a x {Ul,U h − γz}, (1)
where Ul is the minimum wage required to retain a slow learner (his reservation utility)
and Uh − γz is the minimum wage required to retain a quick learner (his reservation
utility minus the expected experience gain).
If the ￿rm is revealed to be a leader, the wage required to retain both types is
w
g =m a x {Ul,U h − z} (2)
where the wage required to retain a slow learner is again Ul, but the wage required
to retain a quick learner is now Uh − z since, due to transparency, a quick learner is
now certain about his experience gain, z.
Finally, if the ￿rm is revealed to be a loser, the minimum wage that retains both
worker types is
w
b =m a x {Ul,U h} = Uh, (3)
since, due to transparency, a quick learner knows that his experience gain will be
zero.
Clearly, the required wage is lower when the ￿rm is revealed to be a leader rather
than a loser (wg <w b) and when its type remains unknown rather than revealed as
al o s e r( wu <w b). Moreover, wg ≤ wu, where this inequality holds strictly when
∆U>γz. To understand this last result, note that:
91. If ∆U ≤ γz, the opaque ￿rm is attractive enough to the quick learner so that the
retention wage is the reservation utility of a slow learner. Hence wg = wu = Ul.
2. If γz<∆U<z , the retention wage of a leading ￿rm is determined by the
reservation wage of a slow learner, but that of a opaque ￿rm is determined by
the reservation wage of a quick learner. Hence wg = Ul and wu = Uh − γz,
which implies that wg <w u.
3. If ∆U ≥ z, retaining a quick learner is always more diﬃcult than retaining a
slow learner. Hence wg = Uh−z and wu = Uh−γz, which also implies wg <w u.
Intuitively, if there is only one type of worker, the expected wage paid by a ￿rm
that is transparent equals the wage paid by a ￿rm that is opaque. However, with
multiple type workers, this need not be the case, since at least one of the types earn
rents in each of the three possible states, and as we show, the expected value of these
rents is higher for a transparent ￿rm.
3.2 Expected labor retention costs
Let w2(d)d e n o t et h e￿rm￿s expected retention wage as a function of the ￿rm￿s leverage
ratio that, under our assumptions, is measured by the probability d that the ￿rm￿s
type is disclosed at t =2 .C l e a r l y ,
w2(d)=d[γw
g +( 1− γ)w
b]+( 1− d)w
u,
where the expressions for wg,w b, and wu, given above, lead to the following lemma:





Ul +( 1− γ)∆Ud, if ∆U ≤ γz,
Uh − γz + γ(z − ∆U)d, if γz<∆U<z ,
Uh − γz, if ∆U ≥ z.
(4)
10Hence, the expected labor retention costs per worker are either independent of (if
∆U ≤ γz) or increasing in (if ∆U>γz)t h e￿rm·s leverage ratio d.
In words, when the quick learners￿ reservation utility premium exceeds their po-
tential experience gains (i.e., ∆U ≥ z), retention wages are driven by the requirements
of the quick learners in all three possible states. Speci￿cally, the expected wage across
transparent states, γwg+(1−γ)wb = Uh−γz, equals the wage required in the opaque
state, wu = Uh −γz, hence the expected retention costs are independent of the ￿rm￿s
transparency. However, when z is suﬃciently high, slow learners become the most
costly workers to retain in the opaque as well as the good state.16 When this is the
case, the retention wage paid in the opaque state, wu, is strictly lower than the ex-
pected retention wage paid across transparent states, γwg +( 1− γ)wb.D u e t ot h e
shift in the worker type whose wage requirement binds for the determination of the
retention wage, the additional compensation that the ￿rm must incur when bad news
about its type is revealed (s = b) is not fully compensated by the wage reduction in
case of good news (s = g). Thus, on average, labor retention costs are smaller if the
￿rm￿s type is not revealed.
4 Capital structure and total labor costs
The analysis in the previous section shows that the workers of one of the two types
earn rents at t = 2. This does not necessarily imply that workers expect to earn rents
throughout their entire relationship with the ￿rm. Indeed, as we show below, if the
workers￿ wealth constraints are not binding, they will oﬀset their expected rents at
16In particular, wu re￿ects the requirement of just one type￿slow learners if ∆U<γz and quick
learners if γz<∆U<z .I n s t e a d ,γwg+(1−γ)wb mixes the requirements of both worker types since
wg is always driven by the requirements of slow learners and wb is always driven by the requirements
of quick learners.
11t = 2 by accepting a lower wage at t = 1. In this case, transparency need not directly
aﬀect total expected wages and, thereby, need not distort the leverage decision d.
4.1 Total labor costs
Let w1(d)d e n o t et h ew a g eo ﬀered by the ￿rm to the workers at t =1 . As forward-
looking workers anticipate the rents that they may obtain at t =2 ,w1(d)m u s t
satisfy:
w1(d)+[ w2(d)+￿γz] − (Ul + ￿∆U) ≥ U, (5)
where the term in brackets accounts for the expected wage and experience gains
obtained at t = 2, and the term in parenthesis re￿ects a worker￿s expected reservation
utility at that date.17 The diﬀerence between the terms in brackets and parentheses,
which is always positive, measures the rents that workers obtain at t =2 ,a sar e s u l t
of asymmetric information about their types.
According to (4), depending on the size of ∆U relative to γz and z, we should
distinguish three diﬀerent parametric regimes. To simplify the presentation, we will
focus on the intermediate regime, with ∆U ∈ (γz,z), which is the richest one in that
the expected retention wage is aﬀected by both the leverage ratio d and the size of
t h ee x p e r i e n c eg a i nz:18
w2(d)=Uh − γz + γ(z − ∆U)d. (6)
Under (6), the minimum value of w1(d)t h a ts a t i s ￿es (5) is given by
b w1(d)=U − (1 − ￿)(∆U − γz) − γ(z − ∆U)d, (7)
17We assume that all workers, irrespectively of being hired by the ￿rm or not, learn their type and,
thus, their continuation reservation utility before t =2 . The experience gains that quick learners
m a yo b t a i ni no t h e r￿rms (if any) are implicitly included in Uh.
18Notice that in the other two cases either d or z have no eﬀect on the expected retention wage.
12which shows that the expectation of rents at t = 2 makes the worker willing to accept
aw a g ea tt = 1 lower than his reservation utility at that date, U. Such a wage is
decreasing in d because leverage increases the ￿rm￿s transparency and this, in turn,
increases the expected retention wage.
If b w1(d) ≥ 0, the workers￿ wealth constraints (that is, the requirement of w1 ≥ 0)
are not binding and (5) can hold with equality, so the ￿rm￿s total labor costs per
worker are
W(d)= b w1(d)+w2(d)=U +( Ul + ￿∆U) − ￿γz ≡ w.
Basically, w is the workers￿ average reservation utility net of expected experience
gains, which does not depend on d. However, if b w1(d) < 0, then the wealth constraint
is binding, so w1(d)=0a n dt h e￿rm￿s total labor costs per worker are W(d)=w2(d).
In this case, the workers earn rents, and these rents are increasing in d (recall Lemma
1). More formally, from (7), we can distinguish three cases:
1. If U − (1 − ￿)(∆U − γz) ≤ 0, then, for all d, b w1(d) ≤ 0a n dW(d)=w2(d).
2. If 0 < U − (1 − ￿)(∆U − γz) < γ(z − ∆U), then there exists some
d ≡
U − (1 − ￿)(∆U − γz)
γ(z − ∆U)
∈ (0,1) (8)
such that b w1(d) ≥ 0s oW(d)=w for d ≤ d, while b w1(d) < 0s oW(d)=w2(d)
for d>d.
3. If U −(1−￿)(∆U −γz) ≥ γ(z−∆U), then, for all d, b w1(d) > 0a n dW(d)=w.
In words, in Case 1 the workers￿ reservation utility is so small that even if the ￿rm
is totally opaque (d = 0), their wealth constraint is binding and they extract rents
from the ￿rm. Case 3 corresponds to the opposite situation: the workers￿ reservation
utility is so large that even a fully transparent ￿rm (d = 1) necessitates a positive
13initial wage to attract workers to the ￿rm (and workers receive no rents from the ￿rm).
In Case 2, the intermediate situation occurs: workers receive rents for high leverage
ratios (d>d), but not for low ones (d ≤ d). This discussion can be summarized as
follows:
Proposition 1 The total expected labor costs per worker are given by W(d)=m a x {w,
w2(d)}, which is increasing in the ￿rm￿s leverage ratio d when the workers￿ wealth
constraint is binding and, otherwise, is independent of d.
4.2 The capital structure choice
At t =0 , if the number of workers hired by the ￿rm is normalized to one, the present
value of its revenue plus the other net bene￿ts of debt ￿nancing, net of the total
expected labor costs is
V (d) ≡ Y + X(d) − W(d). (9)
Thus, except if d = d,i nw h i c hc a s eW(d)i sn o n - d i ﬀerentiable, the ￿rm￿s optimal




which states that the ￿traditional￿ marginal bene￿ts from leverage, X0(d), must equal
its marginal cost due to greater transparency, W0(d).
The form of W(d) allows us to distinguish three cases:
1. d<d. In this case, we have W(d)=w so (10) becomes X0(d)=0 , whose
solution is d = d∗. Hence if d∗ < d, the ￿rm￿s optimal leverage ratio is d∗, which
is determined by the traditional trade-oﬀs captured by X(d).
2. d>d. In this case, we have W(d)=w2(d) so, using (6), (10) becomes X0(d)=
γ(z − ∆U), whose solution is d = b d<d ∗. Hence if b d>d, the ￿rm￿s optimal
leverage ratio is b d, which is smaller than d∗ due to the costs of transparency.
143. d = d. Given the form of W(d), having a maximum at the non-diﬀerentiability
point d requires 0 ≤ X0(d) ≤ γ(z − ∆U), that is, d ∈ [ b d,d∗].
Summing up:
Proposition 2 When the workers￿ wealth constraints are binding (d<d ∗), the ￿rm
chooses a conservative leverage ratio, d =m a x { b d,d} <d ∗. Otherwise, its leverage
ratio is determined by the traditional trade-oﬀs, d = d∗.
Hence, whenever the workers￿ wealth constraints are binding (d<d ∗), the cost
of transparency distorts the ￿rm￿s capital structure decision towards a conservative
leverage ratio d<d ∗. Notice from (8) that d is a linearly increasing function of the
workers￿ reservation utility at t =1 . Thus, ￿nancial conservatism arises when the
initial reservation utility U is small, since in this case the initial wage constraint is
more likely to bind. Transparency is costly in this case because the higher future
labor retention costs cannot be fully oﬀset by a lower initial wage.19
5 Capital structure and experience gains
In this section we endogenize the experience gains z, which we assume are enhanced
by investments undertaken by the ￿rm during the workers￿ training period, i.e., after
they have been hired (t = 1) but before the possible disclosure of ￿rm type (t =2 ) .
The investments that we have in mind include training programs that allow workers
to acquire the ￿rm￿s know-how, R&D investments that widen the applicability of the
￿rm￿s proprietary technologies, or the establishment of con￿dentiality procedures and
19Interestingly, irrespective of the size of workers￿ initial reservation utility, our analysis predicts
that capital structure and, more generally, a ￿rm￿s transparency, has implications for the time pro￿le
of workers￿ compensation. Opaqueness is related to ￿atter wage pro￿les than transparency. Then,
as the leverage ratio d increases, initial wages fall and both the average and the dispersion of future
wages increase.
15licensing practices that limit the ability of outsiders to develop comparable human
capital. As we show, the ￿rm￿s capital structure has an in￿uence on the investment
z, which in turn aﬀects the relationship between the ￿rm and its employees.
We assume that these investments, while observable for both the ￿rm and the
workers, are unveri￿able and hence non-contractible.20 For simplicity, we model them
as a direct choice of z at a cost given by a strictly increasing and strictly convex
function C(z). For brevity, we focus on the same case analyzed in Section 4 by
assuming that the choice of z is restricted to an interval [z,z] ⊂ (∆U,∆U/γ).21
Additionally, in order to highlight the eﬀects channelled through the investment level
z, we initially assume that U is large enough for the worker￿s wealth constraint not
to be binding so that total labor costs, expressed as
w ≡ U +( Ul + γ∆U) − ￿γz, (11)
do not directly depend on the leverage ratio d. At the end of this section we brie￿y
comment on the case in which U is small and, hence, total labor costs are increasing
in d, as in (6).
5.1 The case where z is contractible
We start by examining the relationship between capital structure and the experi-
ence enhancing investment z in a ￿rst-best world in which the latter is contractible.
This provides a benchmark that allows us to determine the eﬀect of having a non-
contractible z. Since workers are assumed to have no wealth constraints, total ￿rm
value includes the worker￿s expected gains from the z investment, ￿γz, which the
20Grossman and Hart (1986) emphasize the importance of relationship-speci￿c investments in
their theory of the ￿rm. See also Hart (1995).
21Thus, we require that ∆U ∈ (γz,z) as in the case in which our previous analysis has focused.
Technically, this would be guaranteed, without further constraints, if limz+→∆U C0(z)=0a n d
limz−→ ∆U
γ C0(z)=+ ∞.




X(d)+[ ￿γz − C(z)]. (12)







Clearly, in the ￿rst-best world the capital structure decision d∗ and the investment
decision z∗ are separable. The leverage ratio d∗ is determined by the standard trade-
oﬀs￿exactly as in the case of exogenous z and nonbinding wealth constraints consid-
ered in the previous section￿while the investment z∗ equalizes the marginal (social)
value of the investment to its marginal cost.
5.2 Analysis when z is not contractible
W en o ws o l v et h em o d e lf o rt h ec a s ew h e r et h ei n v e s t m e n tz is not contractible. As we
show, the resulting level of z is a monotonically decreasing function of d,a n dt h e￿rm
might even commit to choose the ￿rst-best z by adopting the appropriate leverage
ratio. In general, however, because choosing a leverage ratio diﬀerent from d∗ also
has costs, a novel trade-oﬀ emerges and the ￿rst-best z will not be implemented.
We proceed by backward induction: when z is chosen, the leverage ratio d and
the worker￿s initial wage w1(d) have already been ￿xed. So z is set to maximize the
￿rm￿s continuation value, which is aﬀected by z through its eﬀect on the expected
labor retention costs,
w2(d,z)=Uh − γz + γ(z − ∆U)d, (15)
22Notice that the marginal value of the z investment, ￿γ, is less than one because only quick
learners in winner ￿rms enjoy the experience gain. As it will be clear, our results generalize as long
as the marginal valuations of the investments remain diﬀerent across worker types.




γ(1 − d)z − C(z),
which has the ￿rst order condition
(1 − d)γ = C
0(z). (16)
For each possible value of d, this equation de￿nes the solution z = h(d), where, by the
implicit function theorem, h0(d)=−γ/C00(z) < 0. This implies the following lemma.
Lemma 2 When the investment z is not contractible, its level h(d) is a decreasing
function of the ￿rm￿s leverage ratio d.
Equation (16) captures an important feature of the analysis. In contrast to the
￿rst-best case, the investment z and the capital structure decision d are not separable.
Speci￿cally, a more conservative capital structure leads the ￿rm to invest more in its
relationship with the workers, because greater opacity makes retention wages more
sensitive to changes in expected experience gains. So the capital structure decision
can work as a commitment device, allowing the ￿rm to set z at the appropriate level.
The use of such a device, however, is not costless because the leverage ratio which
implements the ￿rst-best level of z is generally diﬀerent from the ￿rst-best leverage
ratio d∗.
Speci￿cally, the second-best leverage ratio, d∗∗, is set taking into account its eﬀect
on the investment z, and thus solves
max
d∈[0,1]
X(d)+[ γ￿h(d) − C(h(d))], (17)
w h e r ew eh a v es u b s t i t u t e dh(d)f o rz in the terms (in brackets) which account for
the eﬀect of the investment on labor costs and, thereby, on ￿rm value. Under our
18assumptions, the objective function in the above maximization is quasi-concave so a








which uniquely determines d∗∗ and, recursively, z∗∗ = h(d∗∗).
It is clear from (13) and (14) that, if h(d∗)=z∗, then d∗∗ = d∗ solves (18)
and, thus, the second-best solution coincides with the ￿rst-best solution. Generally,
however, one of the following cases will arise:
1. The ￿rst-best leverage ratio d∗ induces a level of z lower than the ￿rst-best level,
z∗. In other words, d∗ makes the ￿rm too transparent for the implementation
of z∗. Then (18) is solved with a conservative capital structure, d∗∗ <d ∗, that
partially corrects the problem of underinvestment in z: h(d∗∗) ∈ (h(d∗),z∗).
2. The ￿rst-best leverage ratio d∗ induces a level of z that exceeds the ￿rst-best
level, z∗.T h a ti s ,d∗ makes the ￿rm too opaque for the implementation of z∗.
Then (18) is solved for an aggressive capital structure, d∗∗ >d ∗, that partially
corrects the problem of overinvestment in z: h(d∗∗) ∈ (z∗,h(d∗)).
A parameter that determines which of the above cases holds is ￿, i.e., the pro-
portion of quick learners in the population of workers. Speci￿cally, by comparing
(13) and (16), and noting that if h(d∗)=z∗ then ￿ = ￿∗ ≡ 1 − d∗, we establish the
following result:
Proposition 3 When the proportion of quick learners in the population of workers is
above (below) a critical level ￿∗,t h e￿rm chooses a conservative (aggressive) leverage
ratio d and underinvests (overinvests) in z. Furthermore, as the proportion of quick
learners increases, the ￿rm reduces its leverage ratio d and raises its z investment.
19These results are related to the time inconsistency problem that aﬀects the decision
to invest in z. Forward-looking workers are willing to compensate the ￿rm for their
expected experience gains by reducing their initial wages. However, the ￿rm decides
on the investment z after the initial wages are already ￿xed, and hence, it only
considers the eﬀect of z on retention wages. A more conservative capital structure
results in less transparency and, thus, a greater incentive to invest in z. Hence, by
selecting its capital structure, a ￿rm commits to a speci￿c investment in z.W h e n
the optimal z is high, and the ￿rm anticipates a problem of underinvestment in z,i t
can partially correct it by choosing a conservative capital structure. Similarly, if the
￿rm is ex post tempted to overinvest in z, it can mitigate the problem by choosing
an aggressive capital structure.23
The second part of the proposition establishes that ￿nancial conservatism increases
with the proportion of workers that can bene￿tf r o mt h ez i n v e s t m e n t .T h i si sbe c a u s e ,
when workers are hired (and do not know their type), if they are more likely to be
quick learners, they are willing to accept larger initial wage cuts in exchange for the
expected experience gains, implying that the optimal z is higher.
5.3 Binding wealth constraints
We ￿nalize this section with a brief discussion of the case in which the low value
of workers￿ initial reservation utility, U, makes their wealth constraints binding (so
that w1 = 0). In this case, the future rents that workers appropriate under greater
transparency cannot be transferred back to the ￿rm. Hence, in addition to the eﬀect
channelled through the investment z, t h el e v e r a g er a t i od has a direct eﬀect on the
23To understand why it is possible to have incentives to overinvest as well as underinvest one
should note that although the quick learners bene￿tf r o mah i g h e rz,ah i g h e rz reduces second
period wages and, thus, reduces the rents appropriated by the slow learners. Notice that, as shown
by (14), the ex ante optimal z increases with the proportion of quick learners, ￿,w h i l e ,a ss h o w nb y
(16), the ex-post choice of z does not directly depend on ￿ but on the leverage ratio d.
20￿rm￿s total labor costs, as already discussed in Section 4. Since in this case the initial
wage is set at the minimum level, the ex ante value and the continuation value of the
￿rm (which are the relevant criteria for the choice of d and z, respectively) coincide
and equal
X(d) − w2(d,z) − C(z), (19)
where w2(d,z) is given by (15). Maximizing expression (19) with respect to d and z
leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4 When workers￿ wealth constraints are binding, the ￿rm always chooses
a conservative leverage ratio, ￿ d<d ∗, which is independent of the proportion of quick
learners in the population of workers. Over- and under-investment in z are possible.
This results leads us back to the logic of Proposition 2. When workers￿ wealth
constraints are binding, all labor costs are incurred after the investment z takes
place so the capital structure decision plays no role as a commitment device. The
endogeneity of z does not alter the conclusions reached about the capital structure
choice under exogenous z: ￿nancial conservatism makes the ￿rm less transparent,
which by reducing the wages required to retain the workers, saves on total expected
labor costs.
6W o r k e r s ￿ e ﬀort
Previous sections identify two cases in which transparency reduces ￿rm value: either
by increasing labor costs in the presence of workers￿ wealth constraints, or by altering
the ￿rm￿s incentive to undertake investments that enhance the workers￿ human capi-
tal. In this section, we complete the analysis by considering the case of moral hazard
on the workers￿ side. We show that an additional negative eﬀect of transparency on
21￿rm value can arise when workers exert some unobservable eﬀort that increases both
￿rm output and the value of their human capital. Speci￿cally, under certain condi-
tions, transparency hurts ￿rm value because it leads to reductions in eﬀort when the
￿rm is revealed to be a loser.
As in previous sections, we show that whether or not workers￿ wealth constraints
bind is important to determine the eﬀects of transparency on ￿rm value. Therefore,
we ￿rst analyze the scenario in which workers￿ wealth constraints are binding (so that
the total wage bill is determined by the retention wage bill) and then examine the
scenario in which they are not. In both scenarios we will assume, for simplicity, that
t h ee x p e r i e n c eg a i nz is exogenous and that, the eﬀort problem aﬀects both worker
types equally.
Speci￿cally, we consider a setting like the one described in Sections 3 and 4: the
￿rm is interested in retaining some previously trained workers. In addition, we assume
that, after the ￿rm￿s type is possibly revealed at t = 2, each worker makes a costly
non-observable eﬀort decision e which aﬀects both the ￿rm￿s output and the worker￿s
human capital. Speci￿cally, we consider a representative worker, whose contribution
to the ￿rm￿s output is Y (e), where Y 0 > 0a n dY 00 < 0.24 Eﬀort has a positive eﬀect
on the worker￿s human capital, increasing his human capital by e, but only if the ￿rm
is a leader. Finally, eﬀort has a cost K(e) to the worker, where K0 > 0a n dK00 > 0.
The worker chooses e so as to maximize the value of his expected human capital
gains net of the cost K(e), but fails to internalize the eﬀect of eﬀort on ￿rm output,
Y (e), so his eﬀort is below the ￿rst-best level. Formally, in each state s, es ≡ arg
maxe πse − K(e), where πs denotes the probability that the ￿rm is a leader in such
24In this context, if each individual worker￿s contribution to ￿rm output is not observable, free
rider problems make performance-based compensation ineﬀective in providing workers with incen-
tives for exerting eﬀort. Hence, we abstain from explicitly analyzing the role of performance-based
compensation.
22a state (so πg =1 , πb =0 , and πu = γ). Clearly, eb <e u <e g.
As a ￿rst step in determining how the worker￿s eﬀort choice aﬀects our results, we
demonstrate the following lemma:
Lemma 3 If K000 > 0 (=0 ), then the worker￿s average eﬀort under transparency,
γeg +( 1− γ)eb, is smaller than (exactly as large as) under opaqueness, eu.
Transparency aﬀects workers￿ eﬀort and, hence, ￿rm value through three diﬀerent
channels. The ￿rst channel relates to the average level of eﬀort, which by Lemma 3,
depends on the convexity of the function that describes the worker￿s cost of eﬀort,
K(e). The other two channels have to do with the eﬀect of transparency on the
allocation of eﬀort across states. From the perspective of the worker, eﬀort is better
a l l o c a t e dw h e nt h e￿rm is transparent, i.e., the worker increases eﬀort when the ￿rm
is a leader (and the human capital gain is positive) and reduces it when the ￿rm is
al o s e r( a n de ﬀort does not enhance his human capital). However, if transparency
makes eﬀort diﬀer across states, but keeps it the same on average, the concavity of
Y (e) implies that expected output will be reduced.
To evaluate which of the eﬀects of transparency dominate, we ￿rst consider the
case in which workers￿ wealth constraints are binding: the ￿rm￿s total expected labor
costs are determined by the expected retention wages and, therefore, is independent
of the anticipated eﬀect of the worker￿s eﬀort on his ex ante utility. In this case, the
eﬀect of eﬀort on the ￿rm￿s expected output clearly dominates:
Proposition 5 If K000 ≥ 0 and workers￿ wealth constraints are binding, transparency
reduces ￿rm value.
Notice that Proposition 5 provides a suﬃcient condition, K000 ≥ 0, for the expected
output eﬀect to be positive. If K000 < 0, then transparency produces two opposite
23eﬀects: (i) an increase in average eﬀort, and (ii) an increase in eﬀort variability across
states. Due to the concavity of Y (e), the second eﬀect is a source of potential expected
output losses. Thus, with K000 < 0, the overall eﬀect of transparency depends on the
relative curvatures of K(e)a n dY (e).
When workers￿ wealth constraints are non-binding, the ￿rm￿s total expected labor
costs re￿ect the need to compensate workers for their reservation utility and their
eﬀort costs, but are reduced by the value of workers￿ expected experience and human
capital gains. In Section 4, where adverse selection was the only concern for workers￿
retention, we established that if wealth constraints do not bind, transparency was
irrelevant for ￿rm value. However, when transparency aﬀects workers￿ incentives, it
reduces ￿rm value if and only if the following inequality holds:
Y (eu)￿[γY (eg)+(1￿γ)Y (eb)] > {γ[eg￿K(eg)]+(1￿γ)[eb￿K(eb)]}￿[γeu￿K(eu)]. (20)
To explain this condition, notice that the LHS is the diﬀerence between the ￿rm￿s
expected output under opacity and transparency, respectively, and the RHS is the
diﬀerence between the worker￿s net gain from his eﬀort decision (human capital gain
net of the cost of eﬀort) under transparency and opacity, respectively. In general,
whether (20) holds or not depends on the relative curvature of the functions Y (e)
and K(e).
In order to gain more intuition, consider the quadratic case with Y (e)=y(e− h
2e2)
and K(e)=k
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Hence:
Proposition 6 In the quadratic case with Y (e)=y(e − h
2e2) and K(e)=k
2e2,i f
24workers￿ wealth constraints are not binding, transparency reduces ￿rm value if and
only if yh > k.
In words, transparency reduces ￿rm value if the curvature of the (concave) output-
eﬀort schedule is larger than the curvature of the (convex) cost-eﬀort schedule. In
other words, the relative value of transparency over opacity is reduced if output eﬀects
a r es i z e a b l e( h i g hy), if output exhibits strongly decreasing returns to eﬀort (high h),
and if eﬀort costs are small (low k). Intuitively, transparency is especially costly when
human capital gains associated with working for a leader are high relative to eﬀort
costs and when eﬀort has a major eﬀect on output. When this is the case, workers will
exert substantial eﬀort whenever there is a positive chance that the ￿rm is a leader,
which increases output considerably relative to the case where the ￿rm is known to
be a loser.
7 Capital structure and underinvestment
In previous sections, we focused on the dynamics of the relationship between the
￿rm and its workers, providing a microfoundation for the cost of transparency. In
this section, we take the existence of these costs as given and consider the situation
where the ￿rm has an investment opportunity that, depending on its initial capital
structure, may require the ￿rm to raise external capital. We show that, to avoid
the expected costs associated with the information that is generated in the process
of raising external capital, the ￿rm may pass up positive NPV investments. As in
Myers and Majluf (1984), the ￿rm, anticipating this possibility, may choose a more
conservative capital structure (e.g., one that provides more ￿nancial slack).
Suppose that at date t =1t h e￿rm generates a random cash ￿ow ￿ F, faces a
repayment obligation D, arising from its previously chosen leverage ratio, and receives
25a positive NPV investment opportunity that requires an outlay of I that yields AI >
I,a tt =2 . Assume, for simplicity, that the access to external capital markets reveals
the ￿rm￿s type with probability one and, hence, increases the ￿rm￿s expected labor
retention costs in the way analyzed in Section 3. Finally, to rule out debt overhang
problems ‘ a la Myers (1977), assume that the ￿rm￿s expected output at t = 3 allows
it to meet all relevant ￿nancial obligations and wages.
Clearly, if ￿ F>D+ I,t h e￿rm will be able to both pay D and invest I without
relying on external ￿nance, so the investment will be initiated. At the other extreme,
if ￿ F<D ,t h ep a y m e n to fD will require access to external capital markets even
without investing, so funding the investment will entail no additional transparency
cost and, hence, will be initiated. In the intermediate cases with ￿ F ∈ (D,D + I),
however, the ￿rm can meet its debt payments D with internally generated cash,
but investing I requires external ￿nancing that would not otherwise be needed. In
this case, the transparency cost generated from raising external capital may exceed
the positive NPV of the investment opportunity, leading the ￿rm to pass up the
investment. Speci￿cally, by Lemma 1, transparency implies a rise in expected labor
retention costs of γ(z − ∆U) so we can conclude that the ￿rm will undertake its
investment opportunity if and only if the intrinsic NPV of the investment, (A − 1)I,
exceeds this extra cost.
If instead of having a ￿xed size, the investment can be proportionally scaled within
an interval [0,I∗], then for intermediate realizations of ￿ F the optimal solution to the
investment problem may consist of investing as much as can be internally ￿nanced,
i.e., ￿ F − D.M o r ep r e c i s e l y :
Proposition 7 Suppose the investment opportunity can be developed at any scale
I ∈ [0,I∗], yielding AI. Then, there is a critical value F =m a x {D,D+I∗−
γ(z−∆U)
A−1 }
26such that: (i) if ￿ F ∈ (F,D+I∗),t h e￿rm invests as much as can be internally funded,
￿ F − D, and (ii) otherwise, it invests at full scale, I∗.
Since the incidence of the underinvestment problem is positively related to D
and thus to the ￿rm￿s initial leverage, an implication of Proposition 7 is that ￿rms
with good future investment prospects may try to avoid the underinvestment problem
by choosing conservative capital structures that provide them with suﬃcient ￿nancial
slack. Although this implication is similar to Myers and Majluf (1984), the underlying
problem in our model cannot, in contrast, be solved by ex ante committing the
￿rm to issuing equity or to maximize total market value.25 Only a commitment
that allows the ￿rm to issue equity without generating information would solve the
problem. But this commitment is hardly feasible, since it would involve third parties
such as underwriters and investors whose own interests (and ￿duciary duties) call for
obtaining information about ￿rms that issue equity.
8 Discussion
We organize the discussion of our results in three parts. First, we discuss how the
intuition developed in the paper can be extended to stakeholders other than workers.
Second, we elaborate on the key assumption that information is generated about a
￿rm when it goes to capital markets. Finally, we discuss some empirical implications
of the analysis.
25These commitments might take the form of a contract obligation by the ￿rm to issue equity when
certain trigger events (such as a deterioration of ￿nancial ratios) occur. Alternatively, as noted by
Dybvig and Zender (1991)a n dH a r t( 1993), ￿rms might oﬀer their managers compensation contracts
based on total value rather equity value. The dilution of extant equityholders emphasized by Myers
and Majluf (1984) would then become relevant to the managers when deciding on equity issuance.
278.1 Stakeholders other than workers
Our model focuses on the dynamics of the relationship between the ￿rm and its
workers. However, the intuition we have developed is more general and can be applied
to almost any situation in which information about a ￿rm￿s type in￿uences the terms
of trade between the ￿rm and its stakeholders. To illustrate the generality of our
argument, this subsection discusses the relation between a ￿rm and its customers. As
we argue, there is a direct parallel between a situation in which customers develop
human capital using a ￿rm￿s product and one in which workers develop human capital
working for a ￿rm.
To understand this, consider a ￿rm that, at some initial date, sells a product like
a computer system to two classes of customers (sophisticated and unsophisticated)
who can purchase an upgraded version of the system at some future date. If the
￿rm is a leading innovator, future generations of the system can improve in ways that
bene￿tt h e￿rm￿s more sophisticated customers, who can better take advantage of the
new improvements. However, if the ￿rm is not viewed as a leading innovator, these
sophisticated customers continue to buy the system from the ￿rm at the second date
only if the price of the system is reduced. Unsophisticated customers, who are not
interested in the improvements, are not willing to pay as much for the system as the
sophisticated customers if the ￿rm is a leading innovator. However, since these less
sophisticated customers are not concerned about the improvements, and ￿nd it more
diﬃcult to change systems, they are willing to pay more for the system in the event
that the ￿rm is not a leading innovator.
With minor adaptations, the analysis in Section 3 can be applied to show that
in order to sell the system to both sophisticated and unsophisticated customers, the
￿rm prices the product so that the sophisticated customers realize consumer surplus
28when the ￿rm is revealed to be an innovator and unsophisticated customers realize
consumer surplus when the ￿rm is revealed not to be an innovator. In this case, it
follows that the average price of the system across the states in which the ￿rm￿s type
is revealed, is lower than in the state in which it remains unknown. In other words,
greater transparency leads to lower expected future sale prices. From here, the logic
of Section 4 can also be applied.
This parallel can also be extended to the analysis in Sections 5 and 6. As in
Section 5, since the ability of ￿rms to capture the bene￿ts of their innovations is
aﬀected by their transparency, their incentive to invest in innovations that bene￿t
their sophisticated customers is aﬀected by their capital structure. In addition, fol-
lowing the logic described in Section 6, transparency can also aﬀect their customers￿
incentives to devote time to learn how to use the system more eﬀectively. This can be
particularly important in situations in which the expertise developed by one customer
enhances the value of the product to other potential customers, e.g., when network
externalities exist.
8.2 Capital markets and information revelation
Since the link between raising external equity and information generation is such a
key assumption in our model, it warrants additional discussion. There are two poten-
tial interpretations of this assumption. One is that raising capital provides outsiders
with the opportunity to scrutinize the ￿rm. In other words, raising capital may force
￿rms to disclose pieces of internal information which, when combined with other in-
formation known by outsiders, provide a clear assessment of the ￿rm￿s prospects. The
second interpretation is that raising capital gives outsiders the incentive to scrutinize
the ￿rm. This incentive may stem from the legal mandate for investment banks to in-
29vestigate ￿rms (i.e., perform due diligence) before issuing their shares.26 Beyond this
legal mandate, several reasons, including potential fraud that can arise when ￿rms
raise capital, provide incentives for investment bankers to investigate ￿rms when they
raise new funds.27 Although, for the purpose of our model, either interpretation is
appropriate, most of our discussion focuses on the second interpretation.
Although previous arguments suggest that, in the process of raising capital, the
generation of some information may be unavoidable, in practice ￿rms may try to
regulate the extent to which information is generated when they raise capital. Firms
can and often do issue equity without going through an underwriter. For example,
they can privately place their shares or they can shelf register their shares and then
slowly sell them in the market without going through the book-building process.28
The existing evidence suggests that ￿rms issue equity via private placements in
situations where scrutiny is likely to be costly. For example, Hertzel, et al. (2003)
￿nd that ￿rms that issue equity privately have generally done poorly in the recent
past. To the extent that the asymmetry between the bene￿ts of revealing good
news and the costs of revealing bad news is more pronounced when ￿rms are doing
poorly, this observation is consistent with our model. However, private placements
cannot be viewed as a costless mechanism for issuing equity without scrutiny. Indeed,
as documented by Hertzel et al. (2003), shares that are privately placed sell for a
substantial discount (in their sample of about 16%). Moreover, although information
26For instance, the Securities Act of 1933 (Section II (b)) holds the investment banker involved
in new securities issues liable unless he can prove that ￿he had, after reasonable investigation,
reasonable ground to believe and did believe, at the time such part of the investigation statement
became eﬀective, that the statements therein were true.￿
27In addition to investigating the ￿rm on their own, they generally go through a book-building
process where they solicit and aggregate information from investors.
28Blackwell, et al. (1990) show evidence that underwriters require a ￿premium￿ for shelf issues
which is higher with ￿rms with higher expected due diligence liabilities. They interpret these ￿ndings
as suggestive that underwriters see shelf registration as eroding due diligence and, price this erosion
accordingly.
30is not publicly revealed from the private sale of shares, the buyers generally get a
substantial amount of information from the issuing ￿rms and generally perform their
own investigation.
It is much less likely that ￿rms use shelf registrations to avoid the costs of market
scrutiny. First, very little equity is issued in this way, and casual empiricism suggests
that shelf registration is used mainly by the most established ￿rms. Second, under-
writers are still subject to some legal liability (which may explain why only the most
established ￿rms use this option). Furthermore, regardless of how the new shares are
issued, potential buyers must be induced to add them to their portfolios.29 Perhaps
the absence of an underwriter implies that insuﬃcient information is provided in a
centralized manner, but this does not necessarily mean that no information is pro-
duced. Indeed, some investors have their own due diligence requirements and may
thus be induced to collect the information individually.
Finally, an equity issue may generate information simply because it attracts at-
tention to the ￿rm. In particular, an equity issue may work as a focal point, which
concentrates the attention of investors who may ￿nd it easier to evaluate compa-
nies when other investors are also evaluating the company. In this sense, an equity
issue may be no diﬀerent than a purely cosmetic event like a stock split, which in-
duces investors to collect information only because they believe other investors will
be investigating the ￿rm.30
29Gibson et al. (2003) present evidence that institutional investors purchase securities (i.e., in-
crease their holdings) around secondary equity oﬀerings. This evidence is suggestive because insti-
tutions are better positioned than individual investors to demand information from ￿rms and their
investment bankers and have the resources and expertise to investigate the issuers themselves.
30Grinblatt, et al. (1984) show evidence that suggests that ￿rms may split their stock to signal
that they want to be scrutinized.
318.3 Empirical implications
The capital structure choice in our model is determined by the expected negative ef-
fects of information revelation along with the costs and bene￿ts of debt ￿nancing that
have traditionally been considered in the literature.31 In the analysis, the negative
eﬀects of information revelation are a function of (i) the proportion of workers (or
other stakeholders) who acquire human capital when working for an innovative ￿rm,
(ii) whether there are constraints that require the ￿rm to pay a minimum wage, (iii)
whether ￿rms need to make non-veri￿able investments to train their workers, and (iv)
whether workers require eﬀort to develop human capital.
Our analysis generates cross-sectional and time-series implications that provide
alternative interpretations of a number of empirical ￿n d i n g sa sw e l la sn e wi m p l i -
cations that are potentially testable. The cross-sectional implications arise because
the eﬀects described in this paper apply to some ￿rms more than others. In partic-
ular, our model suggests that leverage should be lower for ￿rms with the following
characteristics:
1. Firms in industries where being at the ￿cutting edge￿ and being a technical
laggard makes a big diﬀerence. This is particularly the case when employees
(and other stakeholders) develop signi￿cant human capital by working with
leaders, but not with laggards.
2. Firms whose stakeholders can make discretionary investments (e.g., employee
eﬀort) that increase ￿rm productivity. This eﬀect is especially important when
the accumulation of human capital or experience gains provide the primary
source of motivation for the investments.
31Although our model focuses on the negative aspects of scrutiny, one can envision an extension
of our model where ￿rms issue equity to invite scrutiny in situations where scrutiny is bene￿cial.
323. Firms which are likely to have positive investment opportunities in the future.
Our model suggests that ￿rms with the above characteristics will experience sig-
ni￿cant losses if unfavorable information about their capabilities are revealed. These
￿rms will thus ￿nd it especially costly to be scrutinized during downturns (i.e., when
their ability to generate cash ￿ow is low), and will thus prefer low leverage ratios
that allow them to avoid external capital markets in these situations. Hence, our
model is consistent with the observation that technology companies, for which these
concerns are especially important, tend to have much lower leverage ratios than com-
modity companies, which are likely to be less concerned about the perceptions of their
stakeholders.
Since our theory was developed to explain why ￿rms tend to avoid equity of-
fers during downturns, it is useful to consider counterexamples to this observation.
Speci￿cally, banks, insurance companies, and utilities do on occasion issue equity
during downturns. These are all examples of regulated entities that are subject to
external scrutiny regardless of whether they issue equity. As an interesting anecdotal
example, many of the merchant energy companies chose to issue equity after Enron￿s
bankruptcy. This is again a case of ￿rms that were being scrutinized anyway taking
steps to shore up their balance sheets during a downturn. Finally, as we mentioned
above, those ￿rms that issue equity during downturns that are not already scrutinized
often issue the equity privately, to avoid the public scrutiny.
It is also interesting to consider the timing of equity issues. Korajckzyk et al.
(1991) ￿nd that ￿rms tend to issue securities right after accounting information is
released, precisely the time in which the market is better informed about the ￿rm. In
addition, Chang et. al (2003) ￿nd that ￿rms that are covered by more equity analysts
tend to issue equity more than ￿rms with less analyst coverage. However, when those
33￿rms with less analyst coverage do issue equity, they generally issue larger amounts.
While the literature has interpreted these and related ￿ndings as evidence of adverse
selection eﬀects, transparency concerns can provide an alternative interpretation.
9C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
We have developed a simple model where a ￿rm￿s pro￿tability depends on how it is
perceived by its stakeholders.32 If stakeholders perceive that the ￿rm is no longer a
leader, the ￿rm will ￿nd it more expensive to retain its customers and employees, and
this will, in turn, lower the ￿rm￿s pro￿ts.
Our model shows that the eﬀects of favorable and unfavorable information about
the ￿rm￿s prospects may be asymmetric. Speci￿cally, the negative eﬀect of unfavor-
able information may exceed the positive eﬀect of positive information. As a result,
during downturns, when uncertainty about the ￿rm￿s prospects is high, ￿rms ￿nd it
costly to take actions, like issuing equity, that generate information about its type.
The link between transparency concerns and ￿nancing choices explored in this pa-
per complements the adverse selection model considered by Myers and Majluf (1984).
In particular, both models explain the observation that U.S. corporations tend to be
relatively conservatively ￿nanced, and both explain why ￿rms are often reluctant to
issue equity.33 An advantage of the model over Myers and Majluf is that we can ex-
plain why ￿rms choose not to take steps that allow them to commit to equity issues
32Titman (1984) also suggests that stakeholder considerations in￿uence the ￿rm￿s capital structure
choices. In Titman￿s model, capital structure choices aﬀect the likelihood of bankruptcy, control
changes and the ￿rm liquidation decision which can impose costs on stakeholders. In contrast, in
the model in this paper, capital structure aﬀects whether information is revealed about the ￿rm
which, in turn, aﬀects the ￿rm￿s willingness to make investments that bene￿t their stakeholders,
as well as the willingness of stakeholders to expend resources (e.g., workers￿ eﬀort) that bene￿tt h e
￿rm.
33See Graham (2000) for an estimation of the reduction in value due to conservatism and Minton
and Wruck (2001) for an empirical analysis of the main features of conservatively ￿nanced ￿rms.
34when they are doing poorly. In contrast to Myers and Majluf, our model cannot ex-
plain the negative returns associated with equity oﬀers, which suggests that adverse
selection clearly plays some role in the equity issuance choice.
Perhaps, a model that combines the insights of Myers and Majluf and our model
may increase our understanding of announcement returns. For example, although
announcement returns are generally negative, there are a number of cases where stock
prices react very favorably to the announcement of an equity issue. One possibility is
that investors interpret such announcements as indicating that management welcomes
more scrutiny, which would be the case when they believe that favorable information
is likely to be generated by the underwriting process. This is an issue that warrants
further empirical as well as theoretical research.
Finally, although our emphasis has been on the eﬀect of capital structure on
information revelation, our analysis can also be applied to other choices that can
aﬀect a ￿rm￿s transparency. For example, a ￿rm may put in place a more detailed
accounting system or hire a more competent auditor, or it may take other actions
that increase the attention of market analysts. In addition, ￿rms may avoid actions,
in addition to raising capital, that generate information. Examples of these actions
could include the termination of a CEO, changing accounting and investment banking
relationships, and forming strategic partnerships and mergers that require extensive
due diligence.34 Extending the logic of our model to consider these other actions is
an interesting area for future research.
34For instance Branderburger and Nalebuﬀ (1996), p. 214, discuss the case of Continental Insur-
ance whose board decided to not entertain a lucrative takeover oﬀer from CNA that was conditional
on due diligence. The board was concerned about the revealed information ￿including the poten-
tial adverse eﬀects a possible decision by CNA (following such due diligence) not to make an oﬀer
could have on market and rating agencies￿ views of the company and on the willingness of insurance
partners to proceed with transactions￿ [Continental￿s proxy statement, March 29, 1995].
3510 Appendix: On the possibility of long-term con-
tracts
In this appendix, we revisit the scenarios in which, according to the analysis in Sec-
tions 3, 4 and 5, transparency concerns distort a ￿rm￿s capital structure decision.
In the scenario in which workers￿ wealth constraints are binding and experience
gains are exogenous (Section 4), the question is whether a long-term contract can
isolate the ￿rm￿s total expected labor costs from the eﬀects of transparency, making
the distortion of the ￿rm￿s capital structure unnecessary. The short answer is no,
except in the trivial￿and unrealistic￿case in which workers can fully commit to
work for the ￿rm up to termination. In such a case, workers would accept a total
intertemporal wage of w when hired and the ￿rm￿s capital structure decision would
be determined by the standard tradeoﬀs.
Notice that even if workers cannot directly commit to work for the ￿rm for more
than one period, the equivalent implication can be obtained by introducing some
pecuniary penalty, L, imposed on workers who depart early. The penalty L reduces
workers￿ retention wage to w2 = w2(d) − L only if their initial wage is (at least)
w1 = L, in which case, the total expected labor costs per worker would be w1 +w2 =
L +[ w2(d) − L]=w2(d), as in the case without penalties analyzed in Section 4.
In the scenario considered in Section 5, i.e., non-binding wealth constraints and
endogenous z, long-term contracts can improve matters only if they contribute to a
better alignment between the ￿rm￿s ex post incentive to invest in z (that depends on
the sensitivity of retention wages to z) and the objective of ex ante value maximiza-
tion (that calls for minimizing the sum of labor and z costs). However, long-term
wage contracts, do not address the fundamental non-contractibility of z. They either
preserve the original sensitivity of w2 to z or fully eliminate it, in which case the ￿rm
36has no incentive to invest in z.35
This polar no-investment solution is surely inferior to the solution without long-
term contracts characterized in Section 5 if the proportion of quick learners in the
population of workers is above the critical level ￿∗ since, in such a case, the ￿rm
already underinvests in z (see Proposition 3); investing zero would simply aggravate
the problem. In contrast, if the proportion of quick learners in the population of
workers is below ￿∗ (so that the ￿rm overinvests in z), it is possible that, by fully
eliminating the sensitivity of the retention wages to z, ￿rm value increases relative
to the solution characterized in (18). Actually, in this case, the optimal investment
in z lies somewhere between the amount invested when all of the workers receive
either short-term or long-term contracts. As a result, the ￿rm could implement the
￿rst-best investment level by oﬀering long-term contracts to some of the workers and
short-term contracts to the rest. In addition, this argument suggests that the problem
of overinvestment in z (and the remedy based on an aggressive capital structure) is
less pervasive than the problem of underinvestment in z (and the remedy based on a
conservative capital structure).
35Indeed, the sensitivity of w2 to z can be eliminated by either committing the ￿rm to a very high
retention wage, so that workers are willing to stay in all states, irrespective of the value of z,o rb y
￿xing a very high penalty for the workers who leave early, so that workers are willing to stay at a
zero retention wage in all states, irrespective of the value of z. In either case, because w2 does not
depend on z, the ￿rm loses its incentive to invest in z, regardless of its capital structure choice.
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